The international harmonization of competition norms and Brazilian competition law : the use of settlement agreements by McMahon, Kathryn E.
  
 
 
 
warwick.ac.uk/lib-publications 
 
 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
McMahon, Kathryn. (2016) The international harmonization of competition norms and 
Brazilian competition law : the use of settlement agreements. Law and Business Review of 
the Americas, 22 (4). pp. 293-331.  
Permanent WRAP URL: 
http://wrap.warwick.ac.uk/87014  
 
Copyright and reuse: 
The Warwick Research Archive Portal (WRAP) makes this work by researchers of the 
University of Warwick available open access under the following conditions. Copyright © 
and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners. To the extent reasonable and practicable the 
material made available in WRAP has been checked for eligibility before being made 
available. 
 
Copies of full items can be used for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge. Provided that the authors, title and full 
bibliographic details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata 
page and the content is not changed in any way. 
Publisher’s statement: 
Article published in Law and Business Review of the Americas. 
Publisher website: https://people.smu.edu/ilra/journals/lbra/ 
 
A note on versions: 
The version presented here may differ from the published version or, version of record, if 
you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher’s version. Please see the 
‘permanent WRAP URL’ above for details on accessing the published version and note that 
access may require a subscription. 
 
For more information, please contact the WRAP Team at: wrap@warwick.ac.uk 
 
	 1	
 
 
‘The international harmonization of competition norms and Brazilian 
Competition Law: the use of settlement agreements’  
 
Kathryn McMahon* 
 
 
 
[pre-publication version. Final version published at (2016) 22 (4) Law and 
Business Review of the Americas, pp 293-331. 
 
 
 
Unlike many other emerging and developing countries where competition laws have 
only recently been enacted, Brazil has had a long history of the application of 
competition laws and policies, culminating in its most recent legislative reforms in 
2011.  Brazilian competition agencies are also internationally commended as a 
success story, particularly for their strong stance against, and criminalization of, 
cartel activity. But there are also emerging difficulties.  In recent years the Brazilian 
constitutional courts have become important sites of social change as they adjudicate 
in areas such as health, telecommunications and financial markets. There have been 
comparatively fewer applications for judicial review in competition law however and 
those who have litigated have been subject to increased costs and lengthy court 
delays.  Rather, Brazilian competition law is increasingly characterized by a shift to 
the extra-judicial resolution of disputes.  This decline in judicial review has had 
important consequences on the supervisory design and effectiveness of regulatory 
institutions and the identification of substantive conduct, potentially opening the way 
to inconsistent and discretionary regulatory interventions. 
 
Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regulatory institutions 
can be linked to similar approaches in other jurisdictions and follow closely the ideal 
of the ‘regulatory state’ and recommendations made in ‘peer reviews’ of Brazilian 
competition law by international antitrust experts and agencies such as the ICN and 
OECD.  The first part of this article will examine the transfer and impact of these 
harmonized regimes and ‘soft laws’ in emerging and developing countries. The 
second part will trace these issues in a particular policy area: the shift in Brazilian 
competition law from judicial review to the increasing ‘settlement’ of competition 
disputes, particularly for cartels. It will evaluate how the local institutional context acts 
to constrain and modify (with implications for its effectiveness) an imported, 
harmonized regime.   
 
 																																																								
*  Associate Professor, School of Law, University of Warwick.  Some of the themes of 
this paper were presented to Courts And ‘The Regulatory State of the South’: The Case of 
Brazil, Workshop, August 7th, 2014, FGV Law School, São Paulo, Brazil.   
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1. Introduction 
 
Brazil is a BRICS economy with the 9th largest GDP in the world.1 Unlike many other 
emerging and developing countries where competition laws have only recently been 
enacted, Brazil has had a much longer history of the application of antitrust laws and 
policies, culminating in its most recent legislative reforms in 2011.  Brazilian 
competition agencies are also internationally commended as a success story, 
particularly for their strong stance against, and criminalization of, cartel activity.  But 
Brazil also experiences difficulties with lengthy court delays and under-resourced 
enforcement agencies.  
 
The story of Brazilian competition law is also inextricably linked to its unique political 
history transitioning from military dictatorship and state ownership to a more market-
oriented economy with the enactment of the 1988 Constitution which laid an explicit 
constitutional foundation for competition law incorporating an ‘economic order’ with 
due regard for ‘free competition’.2 
   
In recent years the Brazilian constitutional courts have become important sites of 
social change as they adjudicate in areas such as health, telecommunications and 
financial markets.3 This growth of judicial review has shifted the balance towards the 
interests of individual rights over those of health care providers and financial 
institutions and has had a vital supervisory impact on the procedural design and 
effectiveness of regulatory institutions.  Notwithstanding the constitutional foundation 
for competition law there have been comparatively fewer applications for judicial 
review and private damages in this area and those who have litigated have been 
subject to increased costs and lengthy court delays.4  Brazilian competition law is 																																																								
1  In 2015 Brazil’s GDP was $1.775 Trillion US: http://data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/GDP-ranking-table. 
2   Constituição da República Federativa Do Brazil de 1988, Articles 170, 173; English 
translation at  http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=8755 
3  See Octavio Ferraz, ‘Between Activism and Deference: Social rights adjudication in 
the Brazilian Supreme Federal Tribunal’, in Helena Alviar Garcia, Lucy Williams, Karl Klare 
(eds) Social & Economic Rights in Theory and Practice: A critical Assessment (Routledge, 
2014); Octavio Ferraz, ‘The right to health in the courts of Brazil: Worsening health 
inequalities?’ 11 (2) Health and Human Rights Journal 33-45 (2013); Viviane Muller Prado, 
‘The Judicial Interference on the Regulation of the Brazilian Capital Market: The Case of 
Executive Remuneration and Transparency’, available at http://idl-
bnc.idrc.ca/dspace/handle/10625/55781. 
4  Luciana L. Yeung and Paulo F. Azevedo, ‘Measuring efficiency of Brazilian courts 
with data envelopment analysis (DEA)’ 22 IMA Journal of Management Mathematics 343-356 
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increasingly characterized by a shift to the extra-judicial resolution of disputes where 
settlement (and leniency for cartels) agreements are concluded at an early stage of 
the investigation process.  This decline in judicial supervision has had important 
consequences on the identification of the boundaries of substantive conduct 
provisions and legal certainty, potentially opening the way to inconsistent and 
discretionary regulatory interventions. 
 
Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regulatory institutions 
can be linked to similar approaches in other jurisdictions.  They also follow views of 
the ‘regulatory state’ and recommendations made in ‘peer reviews’ of Brazilian 
competition regulation by international antitrust experts and agencies such as the 
International Competition Network (ICN) and Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD).  The first part of this article will examine the 
transfer and impact of these harmonized regimes and ‘soft laws’ in emerging and 
developing countries in the context of divergent institutional, cultural and economic 
circumstances. The signing in 2016 of a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) 
between Brazil and other BRICS countries, for the creation of an Institutional 
Partnership for multilateral cooperation and exchange of information on competition 
law issues, is both a recognition of these trends and an effort to propose alternate 
voices and solutions for the institutional and economic challenges faced by the 
BRICS jurisdictions.5  
 
The next part of this article will trace such concerns in a particular policy area: the 
shift in Brazilian competition law from judicial review to the increasing use of extra-
judicial ‘settlement’ of competition disputes. It will demonstrate how the local 
institutional context acts to constrain and modify the importation (and perhaps 
effectiveness) of a harmonized settlement regime, particularly for cartels.   
 
2. The history of Brazilian Competition Law 
 
																																																								
(2011);  Paulo Furquim de Azevedo, ‘What's the Role of Judicial Review in Latin American 
Countries’, 7 (1) CPI Antitrust Chronicle 2-7 (2014). 
5  See Ioannis Lianos, ‘Global Governance of Antitrust and the Need for a BRICS Joint 
Research Platform in Competition Law and Policy’, Centre for Law, Economics and Society, 
Research Paper Series 5/2016, available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2850096. 
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More than 120 countries now have some form of competition legislation.  Many of 
these competition regimes have only recently been enacted in developing and 
emerging economies.6 Competition regimes and the ideal of ‘competition as the 
regulator’ were seen as key technocratic tools in the arsenal of the ‘regulatory state’ 
in the 1990s as the processes of liberalization and privatization were undertaken in 
line with ideas generated by the Washington Consensus.7  As part of this initiative, 
competition laws were implemented to attract Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and to 
ensure that trade liberalization and the removal of price controls were not 
undermined by the creation of artificial barriers to entry, cartels and protectionist 
policies.8  While international development theory may have moved on from the 
purely neo-liberal market-oriented reforms emblematic of the Washington 
Consensus,9 a strong competition law is still seen as an essential arbiter of neo-
liberal market reforms and privatized former government monopolies. 
 
Unlike many of these recent enactments in other jurisdictions, competition policies 
and laws have been present in Brazil for a much longer period.10  These include early 
attempts to introduce competition policy during the process of industrialization in the 
1930s and the enactment of legislation in 1962 (Law No. 4137/62). The 1962 Act 
created the regulatory body, CADE (Administrative Council for Economic Defense, 
Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica), but the legislation was largely 																																																								
6  As many as 75 per cent of countries with a competition regime are emerging or 
developing countries: Eleanor Fox, ‘Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other 
Path’ 13 Southwestern Journal of Law and Trade in the Americas 211, 214 (2013); Taimon 
Stewart, Julian Clarke and Susan Joekes, Competition Law in Action: Experiences from 
Developing Countries (International Development Research Centre, 2007) 4. 
7  John Williamson, The Progress of Policy Reform in Latin America (Institute for 
International Economics 1990). 
8  Eleanor Fox, ‘Antitrust and Regulatory Federalism: Races Up, Down, and Sideways’ 
75 N.Y. U. Law Review 1781, 1788-89 (2000); Frank Emmert and Franz Kronthaler and 
Johannes Florian Stephan, ‘Analysis of Statements Made in Favour of and Against the 
Adoption of Competition Law in Developing and Transition Economies’ (June 1, 2005). Halle 
Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Sonderheft 2005/1, 20-25, 29-30, available at SSRN: 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2341766. At other times competition laws were implemented in 
response to external pressure to meet institutional requirements for membership in 
international organizations or loan conditionality.  
9   The value of these market reforms was also questioned when the promised outcomes 
of the Washington Consensus and import replacement programs did not materialize: see 
David Kennedy, ‘The “Rule of Law,” Political Choices and Development Common Sense’ in 
David M Trubek and Alvaro Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A 
Critical Appraisal (Cambridge UP, 2006).  
10  For further discussion of the history of competition regulation in Brazil see Francisco 
Ribeiro Todorov and Marcelo Maciel Torres Filho, ‘History of Competition Policy in Brazil: 
1930-2010’ 57 Antitrust Bulletin 207 (2012). 
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unenforced under the military government (1964-1985) which favored a more 
interventionist industrial policy focusing on public ownership, price control and 
subsidies.  The enactment of the 1988 Constitution signaled a shift to more market 
oriented policies.   
 
However, competition law enforcement in Brazil was not really effective until the 1994 
statute (Law No. 8884/94).  At that time the ‘Brazilian Competition Authorities’ were 
comprised of the Secretariat for Economic Monitoring (SEAE), a unit within the 
Ministry of Finance, the National Secretariat of Economic Law (SDE) (Secretaria 
Nacional de Direito Econômico) responsible for investigation and CADE, which was 
given independent regulatory status from the executive and was empowered to 
determine final enforcement decisions.   Competition law received prominence in line 
with the movement from a highly concentrated and controlled economy to the 
implementation of more market-oriented reforms.   
 
While competition law regimes in many emerging economies may still struggle to 
achieve enforcement goals, the Brazilian regime has largely been considered a 
success.  Cartel conduct has been criminalized in Brazil since 1990 and leniency 
provisions, which encourage cartel participants to confess their involvement in return 
for immunity from, or a reduction in fines were also put in place in 2000 (Law No. 
10.149/2000).11   Powers to conduct ‘dawn raids’ were also introduced to bolster 
investigation processes and uncover evidence.  While these measures considerably 
enhanced the success of enforcement from 2005 and some large fines have been 
imposed, particularly for cartel conduct,12 institutional problems still remained. CADE 
was under-resourced and faced problems of overlapping jurisdiction and the inability 
to initiate investigations on its own.13 
 
3. Reform of Brazilian competition law in 2011 
 
																																																								
11  The law came into force on December 21, 2000. 
12  See generally Ana Paula Martinez, ‘Challenges Ahead of Leniency Programmes: The 
Brazilian Experience’ 6 (4) Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 260-267, 260-
261 (2015). 
13    See Todorov and Filho (n 10) 233.  
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The reforms introduced in 2011 (Law No. 12.529/2011)14 addressed many of these 
procedural difficulties and overlapping competencies in the former legislation.  It 
included the requirement for pre-merger notification which deals with the problems 
arising from post-merger decisions where the agreement had to be unraveled, 
resulting in a lengthy appeals process.  The new legislation also created longer term 
appointments for commissioners, improving independence and autonomy and 
considerably streamlining the division of work among the competition agencies, 
removing the former complicated regulatory system involving the three regulatory 
institutions where CADE could only proceed to enforcement once an investigation 
had been concluded by SDE.  SDE no longer exists as a separate entity and its 
antitrust functions have been transferred to CADE, which is now made up of the 
investigative branch of the General Superintendence, the Administrative Tribunal and 
Department of Economic Studies. SEAE remains responsible for advocacy and 
promoting competition policies to government agencies.15 
 
4.  Competition law and development  
 
In spite of these recent reforms, competition law enforcement in Brazil faces many 
obstacles. The competition agencies are still under-resourced with respect to the size 
of the economy and there are lengthy court delays for judicial review. While the 
Brazilian economy has undertaken a process of more openness to external 
competition and privatization since 1994, it still remains highly concentrated, with a 
significant level of government ownership and a historical policy of nationalism pro-
development (desenvolvimentismo) which downplayed market forces and promoted 
state intervention, industrialization and import substitution.16    
 
The 2008 global financial crisis also lent political support to more protectionist 
policies. More recently, Brazil has struggled with political instability, a corruption crisis 																																																								
14  The law entered into force on May 29, 2012.  
15     See generally Alexandre Wagner Nester, ‘Brazilian Antitrust Law’ in Marçal Justen Filho, 
Cesar Pereira and Maria Augusta Rost (eds), Brazil Infrastructure Law (Eleven International 
Publishing, 2016); OECD (2014a), Note by Brazil, Roundtable on changes in Institutional 
Design of Competition Authorities DAF/COMP/WD(2014)129; OECD (2015), Annual Report 
on Competition Policy Developments in Brazil - 2014 DAF/COMP/AR(2015)19, 8-9. 
16   Paulo-Tarso Flecha De Lima, ‘Liberalism versus Nationalism: the Prodevelopment 
Ideology in Recent Brazilian Political History (1930-1997)’ 29(2) Presidential Studies 
Quarterly  370-388 (1999); OECD Global Forum on Competition: Contribution from Brazil, 
CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2002)3, 18; Todorov and Filho (n 10) 219-220. 
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and large public debt, leading to the contraction of its GDP.  Brazil also faces 
concerns in common with all emerging economies that grapple with the priority which 
should be given to competition law when there are limited resources and other 
conflicting demands, such as the right to an adequate standard of living, including 
health and housing.17  Competition law in fostering the free market and preserving 
existing power relationships is seen to have little to say about distribution issues and 
inequalities.18  On the other hand under-enforcement of competition law is 
problematic in developing and emerging economies, because international trade and 
globalization expose them disproportionately to the detrimental impact of 
international cartels and the abuse of dominance by foreign firms.19  Domestic and 
international cartels, which have raised the price of many staple commodities, can 
have a real impact on consumer purchasing power and thereby the poverty levels of 
developing and emerging economies.20  Competition can also promote social mobility 
by removing barriers to entry, strengthening equality of bargaining power and 
fostering the new entry of small enterprises.  Strong enforcement of competition law 
has also been linked to increased economic growth.  Such enforcement can also 
have a political dimension because a state dominated by a few concentrated 
																																																								
17  See Fox (n 6) 218; See generally Jens Arnold and Joao Jalles (2014), ‘Dividing the 
Pie in Brazil: Income Distribution, Social Policies and the New Middle Class’, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, No. 1105, OECD Publishing (2014). 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5jzb6w1rt99p-en. 
18  Fox (n 6) 215; On the relationship between antitrust and distributive justice see Herbert 
J Hovenkamp, ‘Distributive Justice and Consumer Welfare in Antitrust’ University of Iowa 
Working Paper (2011) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873463>; Jonathan B. Baker and Steven C. 
Salop, ‘Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequality’ 104 Georgetown Law Journal 1-28 (2015). 
19  Julian L Clarke and Simon J Evenett, ‘The Deterrent Effects of National Anti-Cartel 
Laws: Evidence from the International Vitamins Cartel’ 48 Antitrust Bulletin 689 (2003); 
Margaret Levenstein and Valerie Suslow, ‘Contemporary International Cartels and Developing 
Countries: Economic Effects and Implications for Competition Policy’ 71 Antitrust Law Journal 
801 (2004); Competition authorities in developed jurisdictions also have little incentive to 
prosecute or assist other agencies to prosecute anti-competitive conduct where the 
detrimental welfare effects are external to their domestic market: see generally, Andrew T. 
Guzman, ‘Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism’, 76 N.Y.U.L.Rev 1142 (2001);  
Andrew T. Guzman, ‘Is International Antitrust Possible?’, 73 N.Y.U.L.Rev 1501 (1998); Michal 
S Gal and Jorge A Padilla, ‘The Follower Phenomenon: Implications for the Design of 
Monopolization Rules in a Global Economy’ 76 Antitrust Law Journal 899 (2010). 
20     In Brazil, the uncovering of cartels and prevention of anticompetitive behavior in the 
retail fuel, cement, industrial and medicinal gas and salt markets have been identified as 
directly beneficial to the poorest consumers: OECD (2013a), Competition and Poverty 
Reduction: Contribution from Brazil, Global Forum on Competition, 
DAF/COMP/GF/WD(2013)4, 5; Cf the dismantling of the bread cartel in South Africa: 
Competition Commission v Pioneer Foods (Pty) Ltd [2010] ZACT 9 
http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACT/2010/9.html;  
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interests and wealth transfers can be considered antidemocratic.21  In Brazil the 
enforcement of competition law can also have a direct impact on equality and welfare 
policies as pecuniary penalties are paid into the Fund for Defense of Diffuse Rights 
(Fundo de Defesa de Direitos Difusos) (FDD) which supports projects on the 
environment, free competition, consumer rights and historical, cultural and artistic 
heritage.   
 
5. The transfer of global antitrust expertise and voluntary ‘soft norms’ 
 
The recent reforms to competition law and institutions in Brazil closely follow the 
recommendations of international antitrust experts and agencies such as the ICN,22 
UNCTAD23 and the OECD.  With the collapse of global initiatives to enact a 
multilateral competition agreement24, multi-jurisdictional issues are addressed by the 
extraterritorial application of domestic competition law,25 bilateral and regional 																																																								
21  Simon J Evenett, ‘Links between Development and Competition Law in Developing 
Countries’ (2003) < http://www.alexandria.unisg.ch/export/DL/22249.pdf; Paul Cook, Raul 
Fabella and Cassey Lee, Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing 
Countries (Edward Elgar 2007); Niels Petersen, Antitrust Law and the Promotion of 
Democracy and Economic Growth (2011) <http://www.coll.mpg.de>; cf Todorov and Filho (n 
10) 256-7. 
22 The ICN was established in 2001 as a forum for competition agencies. Today its membership 
includes 117 competition agencies and a number of non-governmental advisors (NGAs): see 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org; ICN Steering Group, ‘The ICN’s vision for its 
Second Decade’ (10th Annual Conference of the ICN, The Hague, Netherlands, May 2011) 6; 
Hugh M. Hollman & William E. Kovacic, ‘The International Competition Network: Its Past, 
Current, and Future Role’ 20 Minnesota Journal of International Law 274 (2011).  
23  The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) provides 
technical assistance to competition agencies in developing countries:  The United Nations Set 
of Principles and Rules on Competition, TD/RBP/CONF/10/Rev.2, 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdrbpconf10r2.en.pdf>.        
24  Many developing countries rejected the proposal for a multilateral competition 
agreement through the World Trade Organization (WTO): WTO, Working Group on the 
Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy (WGTCP) (WTO, 1996) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/comp_e/comp_e.htm#documents>; WTO, ‘Doha 
Ministerial Declaration’ (2001); WTO, ‘Decision adopted by the General Council on the Doha 
Agenda work programme,’ (2004); Taimoon Stewart, ‘The Fate of Competition Policy in 
Cancún: Politics or Substance?’ 31 Legal Issues of Economic Integration 7 (2004); Aditya 
Bhattacharjea, ‘The Case for a Multilateral Agreement on Competition Policy: A Developing 
Country Perspective’ 9 Journal of International Economic Law 293, 302 (2006); David J. 
Gerber, ‘Competition Law and the WTO: Rethinking the Relationship’ 10(3) Journal of 
International Economic Law 707 (2007); D Daniel Sokol, ‘Monopolists Without Borders: The 
Institutional Challenge of International Antitrust in a Global Gilded Age’ 4 Berkeley Business 
Law Journal 37 (2007); Kathryn McMahon, ‘Competition law and developing economies: 
Between “informed divergence” and international convergence’ in Ariel Ezrachi (ed) Research 
Handbook on International Competition Law 209-237 (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
25  While a number of decisions have expanded the extraterritorial application of US 
antitrust: Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California 509 US 764 (1993) the US Supreme Court 
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agreements26 and international antitrust institutions which have been instrumental in 
‘exporting’ expertise and institutional frameworks through the harmonisation of 
competition rules and procedures by means of the convergence of soft norms and 
‘best practice’.    
 
Brazil was subject to comprehensive ‘Peer Reviews’ of its competition agencies by 
the OECD in 2005,27 and again in 2010.28 While not a member of the OECD, Brazil 
has ‘observer’ status and undergoes peer review on a voluntary basis.29 These 
reviews were supplemented by a ‘Follow-up’ in 2012.30  These OECD reviews are 
comprehensive and contain an important level of detail, scrutiny and assessment of 
Brazilian competition law regulation. The impact of its recommendations on the 
reform process in Brazil was acknowledged in their 2010 Review: 
The [2005] Report contained several recommendations for further improving 
competition policy in the country, many of which required amendments to the 
competition law. Those amendments may now finally be enacted. The 2005 
Report also made other recommendations that did not depend on new 
legislation, most of which were adopted. Finally, the report suggested 
changes to improve the legislation that was then pending in the Congress, 
and many of those were also accepted.31  
 
The 2011 legislative reforms mirror the recommendations from these OECD reviews 
including: streamlining and removal of overlapping administrative functions between 																																																								
in F Hoffman-La Roche Ltd v Empagran (2004) (Sup. Ct  2004) 124 S.Ct 2359 reasserted the 
importance of comity to deny damages suits to foreign victims of the international global 
vitamins cartel. 
26  See generally Michal Gal, ‘Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step 
for Antitrust Enforcement’ 60 University of Toronto Law Review  239-261 (2010) 
27     OECD (2005a), Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review (2005) available 
at www.oecd.org/competition 
28      OECD (2010), Competition Law and Policy in Brazil: A Peer Review (2010) 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/competitionlawandpolicyinbrazilapeerreview.htm 
29  An ‘observer’ agrees ‘to associate themselves to certain Council Recommendations, 
to undergo a peer review exercise, to make written contributions to Committee roundtables, to 
actively participate in the Committee’s outreach events and to disseminate the Committee’s 
recommendations and best practices to other authorities… At the expiration of the two year 
period … a review of the results achieved by non members invited during the expired period 
will be important. There will be no presumption of renewal; it will be earned by performance’: 
OECD (2005b), Pro-Active Strategy vis-à-vis non members, DAF/COMP(2005)26, para 7.  
30  OECD (2012b), Follow-up to the Nine Peer Reviews of Competition Law and Policy of 
Latin American Countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico, 
Panama and Peru (2012). 
31    OECD (2010) (n 28) 9. 
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and among the competition agencies and extension of the terms of commissioners.  
Formal settlement procedures were also introduced for mergers and anticompetitive 
conduct.32  Changes to the merger review process included a more expedited review, 
introduction of pre-merger notification, the removal of a 20% market share threshold 
and introduction of a local nexus requirement (calculated on the basis of local 
relevant sales and/or the assets of the acquired party) for merger notifications.33  In 
referring to these changes the OECD stated: ‘[i]n the case of Brazil, the new 
competition law eliminated the market share criterion in line with the peer review 
recommendation’.34 In its report to the OECD, Brazil specifically notes that the 
change to merger thresholds and removal of the market share reference ‘is in 
accordance with international recommendations, that state that notification thresholds 
should be based exclusively on objectively quantified criteria’.35   
The amendments to the Brazilian merger regime also closely followed the 
recommended practices of the ICN36 which together with the OECD,37 has devoted a 
great deal of work to the harmonisation of merger guidelines, with the goal of 
reducing transaction costs for the review of multi-jurisdictional mergers through the 
streamlining of notification procedures.  The ICN invests considerable time and effort 
in advocacy, the collection of data and monitoring compliance with these merger 
																																																								
32    OECD (2010) ibid 74-81. 
33          See generally Abel M Mateus, ‘The New Brazilian Merger Control Regime’ in Philip 
Lowe and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2010: Merger Control in 
European and Global Perspective 315-320 (Hart, 2013); The threshold for mergers has been 
increased so that only larger transactions need to be notified with a state-wide turnover of one 
of the companies of R$750 million: Regulation issued 30 May 2012 by the Ministers of Justice 
and Finance. The turnover threshold can be modified by a specific executive act, without 
discussion by Congress: OECD (2016b), Note by Brazil, Jurisdictional Nexus in Merger 
Control Regimes, (DAF/COMP?WP3/WD(2016)23) 2. 
34   OECD (2012b) (n 30) 19. The OECD observed that a number of economies, 
including Brazil, had amended their notification thresholds in line with the Recommendation: 
OECD (2013b), Report on Country experiences with the 2005 Recommendation on Merger 
Review 2013, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/ReportonExperienceswithMergerReviewRecommendatio
n.pdf; OCED (2016a), Local Nexus and Jurisdictional Thresholds in Merger control, 
DAF/COMP/WP3(2016)4. 
35  OECD (2016b) (n 33) 3 available at 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3/W
D(2016)23&docLanguage=En.  CADE still retains some discretion to review mergers that do 
not comply with turnover thresholds but have an anticompetitive effect in Brazil. 
36 In particular the ICN Merger Working Group’s ‘Recommended Practices for Merger 
Notification and Review Procedures’: See 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/working-groups/current/merger/notification-
procedures.aspx 
37  OECD (2005c), Recommendation on Merger Review (2005), 
https://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/oecdrecommendationonmergerreview.htm 
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practices.38 Many competition agencies, including Brazil,39 have brought their merger 
regimes into closer conformity with the ICN recommendations.40 The ICN reports, for 
example, that: 
Two-thirds of ICN members that made changes to their merger control regimes 
cited the ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review 
Procedures as having influenced their reforms.41  
 
The ICN and OECD belong to the emerging networks of decentralised economic 
ordering in the global economy where rules are formulated by regulators and 
technocrats, not sovereign states.42 This is described as a form of ‘normative 
isomorphism’ brought about by networks of expert epistemic communities and 
international organizations who induce regulatory changes through the promotion of 
‘best practice’ and ‘peer reviews’.43 As the OECD notes: 
There is an emerging international consensus on best practices in 
competition law enforcement and the importance of pro-competitive reform. 
Peer reviews are an important part of this process. 44 																																																								
38  Simon J Evenett and Alexander Hijzen, ‘Conformity with International 
Recommendations on Merger Reviews: An Economic Perspective on “Soft Law”’ (2006) 
University of Nottingham Research Paper No 2006/04, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=893034>. 
39   The introduction of a ‘local nexus requirement’ for merger review was particularly 
attributed to ICN recommendations: see OECD (2016b) (n 33). Jenny notes that Brazil 
‘adopted other measures recommended by the ICN such as the fact that there is no deadline 
for pre-merger notification or the fact that the Superintendent-General must explain his 
reasons when he declares a transaction complex’, Frédéric Jenny, ‘Substantive convergence 
in merger control: An Assessment’, Concurrences  21-41, 29 (fn 15) (2015).  
40  See Mariana Tavares de Araujo (SDE), Brazil: Implementing ICN’s Recommended 
Practices, ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, 2007, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc420.pdf; Mateus (n 33); 
Marco Botta, Merger Control Regimes in Emerging Economies. A Case Study on Brazil and 
Argentina (Kluwer, 2011); Marco Botta, ‘The Impact of Multi-Jurisdictional Concentrations on 
the New Competition Law Jurisdictions, Case Study on Brazil’ in Richard Whish, Christopher 
Towley (eds.), New Competition Jurisdictions: Shaping Policies and Building Institutions, 260-
287 (Edward Elgar, 2012). 
41  ICN (n 22) 2. 
42  Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Governing the Global Economy through Government 
Networks’ in M Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics (Oxford UP, 2000); Chris 
Brummer, ‘Why Soft Law Dominates International Finance – And Not Trade’ 13 Journal of 
International Economic Law 623 (2010); Imelda Maher and Anestis Papadopolous 
‘Competition Agency Networks around the World’ in Ezrachi (n 24) ch 3, 60-88.  
43  Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, ‘The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional 
Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields’ 48 American Sociological 
Review 147 (1983); Peter M. Hass, ‘Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International 
Policy Coordination’ 46 International Organization 1 (1992); Frank Dobbin, Beth Simmons and 
Geoffrey Garrett, ‘The Global Diffusion of Public Policies: Social Construction, Coercion, 
Competition, or Learning?’  33 Annual Review of Sociology 449 (2007). 
44     OECD (2012b) (n 30) 3. 
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Peer pressure and the promise of technical assistance are powerful means for the 
achievement of conformity and compliance.45 In this manner developed countries can 
‘effectively export their rules to the rest of the world’.46 These rules are presented as 
purely technical standards which stand outside politics and do not require democratic 
deliberation.  As Pistor points out: 
The external supply of best practice law, while facilitating more radical change 
than might be feasible without external pressure, sterilizes the process of law-
making from political and socio-economic development, and thereby distances 
it from the process of continuous adaptation and innovation.47 
The peer review system of the OECD, particularly the economic surveys, has been 
compared to a form of soft co-ordination through multilateral surveillance where 
effectiveness depends on persuading reluctant actors.  As Armin Schäfer points out:  
Multilateral surveillance rests on peer review, i.e. on the mutual monitoring 
and evaluation of national policies by other governments. It is targeted at 
bringing states to behave in accordance with a code of conduct or specific 
goals, at developing common standards and at acquiring best practices 
through international comparison. Precisely because there are no sanctions, 
this mode of governance builds on a co-operative effort to criticize existing 
policies and generate new ones.48 
While more research is required about the impact and desirability of these reforms in 
Brazil before any firm conclusions can be drawn, to the extent that they closely follow 
the recommendations of international experts, we can nevertheless begin to question 
their democratic basis and legitimacy.  While some of these reforms were subject to 
extensive debate in both houses of Congress for a number of years, other adopted 																																																								
45  Eleanor M. Fox, ‘Competition, Development and Regional Integration: In Search of a 
Competition Law Fit for Developing Countries’ in Competition Policy and Regional Integration 
in Developing Countries, Josef Drexl, Mor Bakhoum, Eleanor M. Fox, Michal Gal and David 
Gerber, eds. (Elgar 2012).  
46  Brummer (n 42) 642. 
47  Katharina Pistor, ‘The Standardization of Law and its Effect on Developing Economies’ 
(2000) G-24 Discussion Paper No 4 (2000) 2, <http://www.g24.org/PDF/g24-dp4.pdf>. 
48    Armin Schäfer, ‘A new form of governance? comparing the open method of co-
ordination to multilateral surveillance by the IMF and the OECD’ 13 Journal of European 
Public Policy 70-88 (2006); Fabricio Pagani. ‘Peer Review as a tool for co-operation and 
change’ (2002) 11 African Security Review 15-24 (2002); cf The ‘Open Method of Co-
ordination’ (OMC) in the EU operates a similar system of multilateral surveillance through the 
use of guidelines and monitoring devices through mechanisms such as the European 
Competition Network: see Charles F. Sabel and Jonathan Zeitlin (eds), Experimentalist 
Governance in the European Union: Towards A New Architecture (Oxford UP, 2012). 
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recommendations, as the OECD points out, ‘did not depend on new legislation’.49  
Democratic legitimacy questions are also raised by the work of the ICN when norms 
are created by officials from competition agencies who are joined by Non-
Governmental Advisors (NGAs) from private firms, think-tanks and consultancies.   
 
The views of global bodies and experts are persuasive in these circumstances and 
the adoption of these ideas can link regulatory institutions together with international 
like-minded peers potentially bypassing more pressing local concerns and 
democratic scrutiny.  As the OECD noted in its 2012 follow up to the Peer Review: 
The peer review thus serves as a powerful international management tool for 
competition authorities and it provides solid background support when 
arguing for legislative change to improve a country’s competition law and its 
overall competitive environment.50 
The value of ICN recommendations to the Brazilian reform of the merger regime and 
cartel enforcement was acknowledged by a Mariana Tavares de Araujo, a then 
member of SDE:  
Amendments to the law were supported by ICN materials, which were all very 
important to convince government and private sector of need for change.51 
 
The OECD reviews are also followed up by extensive survey questions where each 
jurisdiction is expected to answer a number of standardized questions focused on 
justifications for non-implementation of recommendations such as: 
If the recommendations have not been fully implemented, describe those 
parts that have not been implemented and give the reasons why, in your 
opinion, they have not been implemented.52 
 
The adoption of global norms and the similar practices of peer organizations, 
supported by burgeoning studies and research by experts, have the advantage of 
economies of scale and efficiencies arising from network effects.  This is particularly 
true when policy choices are otherwise constrained by ‘bounded rationality’, 
																																																								
49          OECD (2010) (n 28) 9. 
50  OECD (2012b) (n 30) 7.  
51  Mariana Tavares de Araujo (SDE), Brazil: Implementing ICN’s Recommended 
Practices, ICN Annual Conference, Moscow, 2007, available at 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc420.pdf, 8. 
52          OECD (2012b) (n 30) 64. 
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complexity, uncertainty and an absence of  ‘information and cognitive capacity to 
assess the cost and benefits of each and every alternative’.53 In these circumstances 
‘organizations are rewarded for being similar to other organizations in their fields’54 
and divergence, while possible, is costly.55  Harmonized regimes also foster 
cooperation and exchange of information. Investment and trade opportunities are 
also enhanced, as the ‘follower’ jurisdiction has demonstrated its commitment to the 
control of dominance and prosecution of cartels.56  
 
It is also true however that harmonized regimes and the streamlining of procedures 
for merger review align most clearly with the interests of global commerce and its 
demands for standardized rules, removal of regulatory trade burdens and reduction 
of transaction costs for global mergers. These approaches, not surprisingly, have 
tended to serve the domestic welfare interests of the more powerful and developed 
antitrust jurisdictions, and have had limited success as far as developing countries 
are concerned.  As Fox observes, ‘the ICN agenda is principally set and the norms 
principally forged by the developed world’.57   
 
The invocation of the ICN and OECD standards as ‘international best practice’ 
becomes a powerful and apparently apolitical and neutral standard for critique of 
local law and regulatory processes.  ‘The Merger Streamlining Group’, for example, 
which has representatives of the private Bar and multinational firms, actively engages 
in the monitoring of compliance with the ICN merger guidelines by individual 
competition agencies.58 The Group claimed to be influential in the adoption by Brazil, 
and other jurisdictions, of the ‘local nexus requirement’ for merger notifications.59   
 
																																																								
53     Dobbin et al (n 43) 452. 
54     DiMaggio and Powell (n 43) 153. 
55 Fox (n 45). 
56 Gal and Padilla (n 19). 
57  Eleanor M Fox, ‘Linked-In: Antitrust and the Virtues of a Virtual Network’ 43 
International Lawyer 151, 152 (2009). 
58  The Merger Streamlining Group is ‘a group of multinational firms interested in 
ensuring that international merger review regimes operate effectively and efficiently and do 
not impose undue burdens … [It] pursues this mission through direct submissions to 
competition agencies and governments … The International Competition Network’s 
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures are used as a 
benchmark for identifying and advocating changes to non-compliant regimes’ 
<http://www.mcmillan.ca/merger-streamlining-group>. 
59  See http://mcmillan.ca/files/merger-steamlining-group2016.pdf 
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In order to optimize the benefits of the design and implementation of competition 
legislation for developing and emerging economies, it is important that the particular 
market context of the jurisdiction be taken into account.  In this way the simple 
transfer/transplant of an existing regime chosen from one of the dominant and 
established models in the United States or European Union, is not the optimal 
solution.  While homogeneity and convergence of global competition laws may be 
desirable for the efficient transaction of international business, this approach fails to 
recognize that the success of these regimes more often demands attention to 
divergence, adaptation and learning.60  Programs of technical assistance are found to 
more effective to the extent they do not merely impose simple solutions but consider 
the political, cultural61 and economic context of each jurisdiction.62  While the success 
of the ICN may be measured by convergence, reducing the ‘potential chilling effects 
from differing substantive standards and polices’ and ‘duplicative procedures’,63 the 
divergent interests of developing countries remain largely unrecognised.64  A failure 
to acknowledge these factors may account for the mixed results of competition law 
transplants in various jurisdictions.65  
 
The achievement of perfect international convergence is also an impossible goal. As 
Frédéric Jenny argues, attempts towards full harmonization of merger rules will 
always prove elusive (and unrealistic) given the number of competition regimes in the 
global economy. There will always be legitimate justifications for substantive and 
procedural divergence grounded in the pursuit of differing competition goals, market 
size and industrial policy, particularly for developing and emerging economies.66  In 																																																								
60 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant 
Effect’ (2003) 51 Am J Comp L 163; ICN, Lessons To Be Learnt From The Experiences of 
Young Competition Agencies, Competition Policy Implementation Working Group (2006), 
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc369.pdf; McMahon (n 24) 
209-237. 
61  Thomas K. Cheng ‘How Culture May Change Assumptions in Antitrust Policy’ in  
Ioannis Lianos and D. Daniel Sokol (eds), The Global Limits of Competition Law, 205- 220 
(Stanford UP, 2012). 
62  Michael W Nicholson, D Daniel Sokol and Kyle W Stiegert, ‘Assessing the efficiency 
of antitrust/competition policy technical assistance programs’ (ICN Cape Town Conference, 
2006), <http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/Nicholson_Final_ICN_report.pdf>. 
63  ICN (n 22). 
64  Michal S. Gal, ‘Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement 
Challenges Faced by Small and Developing Jurisdictions’ 33 Fordham International Law 
Journal 10 (2009). Alternatives to the dominance of the US and EU models are beginning to 
emerge however such as the signing of the MoU by the BRICS competition authorities: above 
(n 5). 
65  Berkowitz et al (n 60) 164-65.   
66  Jenny (n 39) 21-41. 
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Brazil, the introduction of pre-merger review may, for example, place a strain on 
already limited resources67 and shift them away from other priorities.  While the 
changes to the merger threshold should reduce the number of transactions subject to 
review,68 CADE approval will become necessary for the conclusion of transactions 
and there will be increased pressure on officials within tight time frames.69  
 
Brazilian Supreme Court Judge Ricardo Villas Bôas Cueva has also argued that 
some aspects of ‘transplanted’ antitrust regimes are not immediately suited to a civil 
law jurisdiction: 
The judicial examination of antitrust cases might be hampered not only by the 
intrinsic complexity of economic analysis but also by unnecessary misuse of a 
legal jargon derived from uncritical import of legal concepts, mostly from the 
common law-based American system. The practitioners of antitrust law in 
Brazil, as well as the staff and members of the competition authorities, tend 
indeed to clutter up their petitions, reports and decisions with language that is 
not easily understandable by judges, who are usually not familiar with the 
common law culture- and are not supposed to know it anyway – since the legal 
system in Brazil is based on the civil law model from continental Europe.70 
He goes on to describe one example of this ‘cultural misapprehension’ as the import 
of American standards of proof for antitrust infringements which he argues are better 
suited to jury trials.  Cueva acknowledges that standards of proof and safe harbors71 
can foster legal certainty and predictability in competition law adjudication where the 
alternative would be a full-scale ‘rule of reason’ assessment of economic facts. He 
however also suggests that these can be absorbed in the civil law system through a 
better clarification, and greater utilization, of the formal nature of the infringement as 
‘formal’ (‘per se’) or ‘material’ (dependence on ‘effect’) rather than reliance on 
standards of proof.72 The difficulty with this approach is that in competition law it is 
often impossible to draft a legislative provision (even in civil law jurisdictions) that 
would encapsulate the multiple instances of abusive conduct.  
																																																								
67    Todorov and Filho (n 10) 253. 
68  Id at 251. 
69  Id. 
70  Ricardo Villas Bôas Cueva, ‘Judicial Review of antitrust decisions in Brazil’ in 
Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2013 (Juris Publishing, 2014) 399. 
71  An agreement or merger may have to reach a certain market share threshold before it 
will be evaluated for anti-competitive concerns.  
72  Cueva (n 70) 399-400.  
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6. Institutional reform of competition agencies and the ‘regulatory state’ 
 
The reforms to the institutional structure of competition law in Brazil also coincide 
with the value placed on depoliticized, autonomous institutions and the technocratic 
application of neutral rules in the ‘regulatory state’73 where there is a concern for 
market outcomes rather than redistribution (in a ‘welfare state’) and ‘legitimacy is 
accorded to depoliticized expert knowledge’.74  
 
A number of semi-autonomous regulatory institutions, known as ‘autarchies’, were 
created in Brazil during the period of liberalization and privatization in the late 1990s, 
for carrying out decentralized state economic activities.75  These institutions were a 
relatively new, and not always welcome, phenomenon in Brazil as their role was 
closely associated with the ‘state in transition’ as it withdrew from economic activities.   
 
Since 1994, competition agencies in Brazil have been similarly created as an 
‘autarchy’, linked to the Ministry of Justice. The 2011 reforms aimed to further 
increase the independence and regulatory powers of the competition institutions, 
streamlining and removing overlapping roles. The increase in the terms of office of 
the CADE President and Commissioners to four years and new provisions for 
reappointment were made in ‘line with the suggestions made by the OECD’s 
report’.76  This coincided with a growing professionalization and specialization of the 
regulatory personnel.  The number of economists and level of training in economics 
for regulators were prioritized77 and professionals with ‘North American educational 																																																								
73  Giandomenico Majone, ‘The rise of the regulatory state in Europe’ 17 West European 
Politics (1994) 77-101; Colin Scott, ‘From Welfare State to Regulatory State: Meta-Regulation 
and Beyond’ 11 University of Tokyo Journal of Law and Politics 159-173 (2014); Karen 
Yeung, ‘The Regulatory State’ in Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Regulation  64-85 (Oxford UP, 2010). The new institutional economics 
also links institutional performance with economic growth. See generally Douglass North, 
Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge UP, 1991). 
74   Navroz K. Dubash and Bronwen Morgan, The Rise of the Regulatory State of the 
South: Infrastructure and Development in Emerging Economies, 10 (Oxford UP, 2013). 
75  Marçal Justen Filho, ‘An Overview of Brazilian Law’ in Filho et al (eds) (n 15) 13; 
Nester, ‘Control of the Regulatory Agencies’, ibid, 20. 
76  OECD (2014a) (n 15) 5, citing OECD (2005a) (n 27). 
77     In 2009 CADE created a Department of Economic Studies (DEE), comprising full time 
economists, which were to be integrated with the Technical Group in Economics, created in 
2008.  Their activities included conducting a number of ‘internal training sessions, 
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credentials’78 were sought after and appointed to the agencies.  Luciano Timm notes 
that many of CADE’s economists have US doctorates and that US antitrust law is 
therefore ‘highly persuasive’ although ‘CADE would not refrain from judging a case 
adapted to the Brazilian market’.79 As DiMaggio and Powell point out:  
To the extent managers and key staff are drawn from the same universities 
and filtered on a common set of attributes, they will tend to view problems in a 
similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as 
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the 
same way.80 
 
Brazilian expertise has also been ‘exported’, Brazilian officials have provided 
technical assistance and trainee programs for other competition agencies in Latin 
America, as transferred knowledge and expertise are further circulated to other 
institutions and jurisdictions.81 
  
Dubash and Morgan point out, however, that the regulatory state in the South does 
not always correspond to a depoliticized entity. Rather it is ‘positioned on a spectrum 
between “rules and deals”, and shaped by a modified and expanded range of 
contextual factors’82 where autonomous institutions applying neutral rules give way to 
a more ‘embedded’ regulatory state.  Politicized institutions engage in ‘deals’ with 
stakeholders to achieve distributive, perhaps more politically expedient, outcomes 
such as equitable access to water and electricity. A broader regulatory space 
emerges which is inhabited by the courts, civil society and bureaucratic networks.83 
 
Increased specialization and insulation from politics may therefore not always be 
desirable in an emerging or developing economy. Competition agencies, for 
example, may want to assume a number of roles, with mixed and broader functions 
																																																								
participating in international forums on antitrust economics and in bi-lateral consultations with 
expert economist from other jurisdictions’: OECD (2010) (n 28) 38-39. 
78     OECD (2010) (n 28). 
79  Luciano Benetti Timm, ‘Jurisdiction, Cooperation, Comity, and Competition Policy in 
Brazilian International Antitrust Law’ in Andrew T. Guzman, Cooperation, Comity, and 
Competition Policy, ch 4, 80 (Oxford UP, 2011). 
80     DiMaggio and Powell (n 43) 153. 
81     OECD (2010) (n 28) 50-51. 
82 Dubash and Morgan (n 74) 2. 
83  Dubash and Morgan, ‘The Embedded Regulatory State: Between Rules and Deals’ in 
Dubash and Morgan (n 74) 280, 283. 
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normally undertaken by sector-specific regulators such as licensing, standard-setting, 
utility access regulation and consumer protection legislation.84  This has not been the 
approach in Brazil however, where the competition agency is solely vested with the 
competition regulation of sector specific areas (subject to some remaining 
jurisdictional disputes in areas such as banking85) leaving non-competition issues to 
be resolved by the specialist sector regulators. In keeping with this desire to 
‘depolitize’ and streamline roles, the 2012 reforms also separated the consumer 
protection functions from the competition agency and created a new body, the 
National Consumer Secretariat.86   
 
Competition agencies in developing and emerging economies can also be expected 
to play an important role in ‘competition advocacy’ which includes the promotion of 
government policy to assess industrial policy, regulatory review of anticompetitive 
legislation, reviews of technical standards, competition market studies and the 
implementation of measures to remove antitrust immunity and ensure competitive 
neutrality between public and private enterprises.  In Brazil this role has been an 
important counterweight to the powerful producer groups which have lobbied for price 
controls and special protections, for example.87  Regulatory independence and 
autonomy are valued in these circumstances in order to diminish the potential for 
rent-seeking, political influence and capture. But as Frédéric Jenny88 points out, more 
politicized institutions also have an important role to play.  There can be a trade-off 
between the independence of the competition authority and the ability to access 
important ‘insider’ government information available to a more politicized body with 
strong links to the executive, and which is required to achieve effective advocacy.  
 
																																																								
84    Michal S Gal, (2004) ‘The Ecology of Antitrust: Preconditions for Competition Law 
Enforcement in Developing Countries’ in UNCTAD, Competition, Competitiveness and 
Development: Lessons from Developing Countries, UNCTAD/DITC/CLP/2004/1, 35. 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//ditcclp20041ch1_en.pdf 
85     CADE shares authority for review of banking mergers with the Central Bank 
(BACEN): see decision of Superior Court of Justice (Brazil) 2010 (REsp 1.094.218-DF), 
Bradesco and BCN  v CADE; OECD (2010) (n 28) 67;  see Nester (n 15) 71-73; Bruno 
Meyerhof Salama and Thiago Jabor Pinheiro, ‘Citizens vs. Banks’  DIREITO GV Working 
Papers (2013) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2335116. 
86  OECD (2014a) (n 15) 5. 
87          OECD (2002) (n 16) 18-19. 
88  Frédéric Jenny,  ‘Competition Authorities: Independence and Advocacy’ in Lianos and 
Sokol (n 61) 158-176. 
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In Brazil, SEAE historically had an important role in competition advocacy.89  The 
OECD cautioned however that its home in the Ministry of Finance made it ‘more 
susceptible to political influence than would that of an independent agency’90 but also 
observed that it may be useful to have ‘integration of the agency into the government 
system to be better-placed to engage and influence policy-making’.91  It is not 
surprising therefore that the OECD specifically recommended setting up mechanisms 
to enable SEAE to participate in legislative reform of the regulated sectors and the 
2011 reforms put this in place.92  While SEAE still maintains a role in competition 
advocacy, with more recent reforms it has been removed completely from 
competition law enforcement, and SDE has been dismantled. It will remain to be 
seen whether this demarcation of functions will have an adverse effect on 
competition advocacy in the future or whether a more politicized role may have 
permitted the pursuit of other legitimate industrial policy goals, together with 
competition law, similar to the position between ‘rules and deals’, characteristic of 
institutions in the ‘regulatory south’.93 
 
This more political role for competition law institutions is not confined to the 
‘regulatory south’. Western governments throughout history have readily intruded on 
the ‘autonomy’ of competition agencies.   During the global financial crisis, for 
example, competition authorities were often not consulted by the executive on crucial 
issues impacting competition policy or their recommendations were side-stepped or 
ignored.94 The courts have also had a fundamental role to play in the political 
development of competition policy.  For example, Kovacic and Shapiro have traced 
how the Supreme Court has shaped US antitrust policy for over a century since the 
early interpretation of the Sherman Act in 1890, as it reacted to political and 
economic events such as the Great Depression and the New Deal and adopted 																																																								
89        OECD (2010) (n 28) 68-72. 
90        OECD (2010) ibid, 69. 
91      OECD (2012b) (n 30) 10.   
92      OECD (2012b) ibid 37-38. 
93  Dubash and Morgan (n 74) 2. 
94         In 2008 the UK competition regulator, the Office Fair Trading (OFT) (now the 
Competition & Markets Authority (CMA)) had advised that the merger of two major banks 
Lloyds TSB and HBOS should be referred to the Competition Commission (now CMA) 
because it could threaten competition in banking services to small and medium sized 
enterprises and in mortgage markets: OFT, Anticipated acquisition by Lloyds TSB plc of 
HBOS plc (October 24, 2008). The UK Secretary of State however cleared the merger with no 
reference to the Competition Commission. The decision was upheld by the Competition 
Appeals Tribunal on judicial review: Merger Action Group v Secretary of State for Business, 
Enterprise and regulatory Reform [2008] CAT 36. 
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changing attitudes to collusion and cooperation, protectionism and global 
competition.95   
 
These brief examples demonstrate that autonomous and depoliticized competition 
institutions are merely idealized versions of the transplanted ‘western model’.  The 
use of competition law and policy as an enforcement tool has always been highly 
political and inextricably linked with ideas surrounding the role of the state within the 
economy.96  
 
Many of the recent reforms to Brazilian competition law and regulation can be traced 
to similar approaches in other jurisdictions and follow closely conceptions of the 
‘regulatory state’ and recommendations made in ‘peer reviews’ of Brazilian 
competition regulation by international antitrust experts and agencies such as the 
ICN and OECD.  While the implementation of international harmonized regimes can 
have beneficial effects, it is also true they are often applied, particularly in emerging 
and developing countries, with little regard for the institutional, cultural and economic 
context.  The second part of this article will trace these concerns in a particular policy 
area: the shift in Brazilian competition law from judicial review to the increasing use 
of extra-judicial ‘settlement’ of competition disputes. It will demonstrate how the local 
institutional context acts to modify the importation (and perhaps effectiveness) of a 
harmonized settlement regime.   
 
7. The use of settlements in Brazilian Competition Law 
 
In ‘peer reviews’ the OECD encouraged CADE to make more use of its settlement 
powers97 and promoted the model, used by many international competition agencies, 
that settlements together with leniency, provide an effective deterrent of cartel 
																																																								
95       William Kovacic and Carl Shapiro, ‘Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal 
Thinking’ 14 Journal of Economic Perspectives 43 (2000). 
96  These same political concerns, for example, have influenced the changing attitudes 
to the regulation of cartel behavior.  While today most would recognize cartels as the 
‘supreme evil of antitrust’: Verizon Communications v Law Offices of Curtis V Trinko 540 U.S. 
398, 408 (2004) this was not the dominant view in Europe where in the early part of the 
twentieth century European cartels were not merely tolerated but embraced as a remedy for 
unstable market behavior during the period of industrialization: see generally Christopher 
Harding and Julian Joshua, Regulating Cartels in Europe:  A Study of Legal Control of 
Corporate Delinquency 27 (Oxford UP, 2003). 
97  OECD (2010) (n 28) 80; OECD (2012b) (n 30) 40. 
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behavior.  Deterrence is very much dependent however on the institutional 
framework for enforcement.98 It requires the intersection of a number of finely 
balanced factors which reduce uncertainty and risk for the applicant by minimizing 
exposure to criminalization and/or private damages.  The operation of the Brazilian 
cartel settlement program provides a good example of how institutional and cultural 
factors can demand adaptation and even resistance to the mere transfer of an 
international harmonized model.  Extensive modification however can also disrupt 
expected outcomes and undermine effectiveness.  In Brazil the dominant driver for 
settlements was not to just to promote deterrence but also to alleviate court 
bottlenecks and save agency resources.  As the OECD suggests, a settlement 
scheme in the absence of a strong and effective system of enforcement and penalty 
by the judiciary can undermine its deterrent value and should be used ‘very 
cautiously’.99  
 
8.  The decline in effectiveness of judicial review of competition law decisions 
 
The 1988 Brazilian Constitution laid down a constitutional foundation for competition 
policy where Article 173, paragraph 4 provides that ‘[t]he law shall repress the abuse 
of economic power that aims at the domination of markets, the elimination of 
competition, and the arbitrary increase of profits’ and Article 170 states that the 
‘economic order’ of Brazil shall be ‘founded on the appreciation of the value of human 
work and on free enterprise’ and shall operate ‘in accordance with the dictates of 
social justice’ with ‘due regard’ for certain principles, including ‘free competition’.100 A 
constitutional foundation for competition law is rare and has few equivalents in other 
jurisdictions.101  These provisions have not translated however, unlike other areas of 
social policy where courts have played a more interventionist and redistributive role, 																																																								
98   Daniel A. Crane, The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement (Oxford UP, 
2011)  
99  OECD (2008a) ‘Plea Bargaining/ Settlement of Cartel Cases’ DAF/COMP(2007)38, 
43, available at https://www.oecd.org/competition/cartels/40080239.pdf. See discussion 
below. 
100     Constituição da República Federativa Do Brazil de 1988, Articles 170, 173. 
101  It does have similarities, however, to the European notion of an ‘economic 
constitution’ which is linked to the historical foundations of European Union competition law in 
the economic ideas of the German ‘ordo-liberalists’:  see generally David J Gerber, Law and 
Competition in Twentieth Century Europe, Protecting Prometheus, ch 7 (Oxford UP, 1998); 
Heike Schweitzer, ‘The History, Interpretation and Underlying Principles of Sec. 2 Sherman 
Act and Art. 82 EC’ in  Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds), European Competition Law 
Annual 2007: A reformed approach to Article 82 EC, 119-164 (Hart, 2008). 
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to actionable individual rights in the area of competition law.102 The courts, unlike the 
US, have not therefore played a dominant role in development and evolution of 
competition law and policy in Brazil.   
 
Competition law also does not readily give rise to individual socio-economic rights 
which can be used by consumers to challenge anti-competitive conduct in courts.  
Damages to consumers as a result of anticompetitive action are usually small and 
fragmented.   While competition law benefits consumers, it does so indirectly, 
through the fostering of competitive markets.   Collective actions and litigation by 
consumer groups can be a solution but these require a receptive and developed civil 
litigation system.103   
 
The effectiveness of enforcement is also largely dependent on the quality of tools for 
the detection of infringements and the efficacy of investigations, decision-making and 
judicial appeals.  While recent legislative reforms have been important, competition 
law in Brazil still faces institutional deficiencies particularly in regard to the 
considerable delays in judicial proceedings and delayed payment of fines. CADE has 
a relatively small budget for the number and length of investigations.104 While there 
has been a steady increase in fines, particularly for abuse of dominance and cartels, 
the number of cartels prosecuted is few relative to an economy which is ranked 9th 
largest by GDP in the world.105   
 
A shortage of human resources and procedural instruments which permit both an 
increased number of suits and number of appeals has also contributed to court 
delays.106  CADE’s final decisions cannot be appealed at the administrative level, but 
a Constitutional guarantee which permits judicial review of ‘any injury or threat to a 
right’, potentially opens up all competition law decisions to substantive review.107   																																																								
102           This more interventionist role for the court is also considered to go beyond merely ‘a 
bolstering of the boundaries of the regulatory state’ Dubash and Morgan (n 74) 13. 
103  See discussion of private damages below. 
104  The volume of cases undertaken by CADE is large.  In 2012 there were ‘over 300 
cases involving anticompetitive practices roughly 120 of which are cartel investigations in 
several markets’: see Carlos Emmanuel Joppert Ragazzo and Diogo Thomson de Andrade, 
‘Beyond Detection: The Management of Cartel Cases’, Competition Policy International, 3 
(2012), available at www.competitionpolicyinternational.com. 
105 Todorov and Filho (n 10) 249-250. 
106   Yeung and Azevedo (n 4) 344. 
107  Constituição da República Federativa Do Brazil de 1988, Article 5. For a discussion 
of the legal basis for judicial review of CADE’s decisions see: Pedro Paulo Salles Cristofaro, 
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Azevedo points out that the average length of court proceedings, at just below five 
years,108 is considerably above the average of three years of those surveyed by the 
ICN, including Brazil, in their review of ‘Competition and the Judiciary’.109  Lawsuits 
where a CADE decision is contentious can last for ten years.110  This is particularly 
problematic for mergers and some complex merger cases have been unresolved for 
seven to ten years.111 This is within the context of a general court system which is 
already under strain.112  
 
Cueva claims that the delays in litigation in Brazil can be partly attributed to the ‘lack 
of clear definition of the standard of judicial review of administrative acts’.113 The 
problems faced by judicial review in Brazil are exacerbated by the problems faced in 
all competition law jurisdictions of determining the appropriate boundary between 
deference to the ‘technical discretion’ of the regulator and the assessment of ‘legality’ 
by the courts.   Decision-making by both regulators and courts in competition law is 
highly fact intensive with significant reliance on experts and economic theory for both 
the formulation of legal rules and their application in complex contexts.  
 
Brazil, together with other Latin American countries, has adopted the French civil law 
system of administrative law.  Traditionally, the civil law system permitted substantive 
merits-based review of administrative action while, in the common law, there has 
been more willingness to defer to the expertise of the decision maker while ensuring 
procedural regularities (such as procedural fairness) and legality based on rational 																																																								
‘Judicial Review of CADE’s Decisions’ in Cristianne Zarzur, Nrisztian Katona and Mariana 
Villela (eds), Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, ch XV, 371-393 (IBRAC, 2015). 
108  Azevedo, (n 4) 4. The data (which relates to Law 8.884) is based on a lengthy study 
of judicial decisions in Brazil by Juliano Souza de Albuqerque Maranhão, Paulo Furquim de 
Azevedo, Tercio Sampaio Ferraz Junior, Direito Regulatório e Concorrencial no poder 
Judiciário (Editora Singular, 2014). 
109       Azevedo (n 4) 4; ICN, Competition and the Judiciary: a Report on a Survey on the 
Relationship between Competition Authorities and the Judiciary (2006).  
110       Azevedo, (n 4) 4-5;  Todorov and Filho (n 10) 251.  
111   The Nestle-Garoto merger case was under review for 14 years: Azevedo (n 4) 4-5. 
112   Yeung and Azevedo point out that in the Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal) 
an average process takes 14 years to complete and ‘the 11 justices at the STF collectively 
decided more than 130,000 cases in the year 2008 and 150,000 in 2007. This heavy 
workload is not particular to the Supreme Court: any judge in Brazil is, on average, 
responsible for 10,000 cases at any moment in time’: Yeung and Azevedo (n 4) 344. 
113   Cueva (n 70) 397; The difficulty in drawing appropriate lines of authority between the 
regulator and the courts in competition law is readily apparent in a number of EU judicial 
decisions: see for example Case T-342/99 Airtours v Commission [2002] ECR II-2585; 
Case T-5/02 Tetra Laval BV v Commission [2002] 5 CMLR 28. 
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and reasonable decision-making.114  These questions about the appropriate 
institutional role and boundaries of administrative discretion vis-à-vis	the courts are 
further complicated in the context of an extensive and complicated system of judicial 
review in Brazil that has weak system of precedent115 but also a jurisprudence which 
has emerged from a long history of military dictatorship and a more interventionist 
role for government in the economy and civil society.  
 
The perceived response of international agencies to this complexity is to strengthen 
the technocratic economic knowledge base of the judiciary.  In its review of 
‘Competition and the Judiciary’ the ICN concluded that there was a ‘lack of 
specialized knowledge on competition issues by the judiciary’116 and ‘[w]hat is 
identified by the results of the report is the urgency to bring judges closer to the 
technical analysis made by competition authorities, especially in developing 
countries.  This is an important conclusion for providers of technical assistance…’.117 
The OECD has also suggested designating specialist judges and the establishing 
appellate panels to resolve competition law issues and judges in Brazil already 
attend judicial seminars on competition policy.118  But, this may only serve to further 
confine judicial decision-making to a purely technocratic/ ‘scientific’ adjudication 
however and exclude the possibility of taking into account broader ‘constitutional’ 
public policy issues.  
 
The threat of judicial review and the number of appeals under the 1994 Act did 
however have a positive impact on the quality of CADE’s substantive decision-
making and administrative processes, including improvements in its by-laws, 
increased transparency and due process.119  More recently there has been a decline 
in the number of appeals and the judicial review which does take place is also 
unlikely to have a real effect on modifying or streamlining administrative procedures 
given that those who seek judicial review are more likely to use it tactically, taking 
																																																								
114  See generally Francis Bignami, ‘Comparative Administrative Law’ in The Cambridge 
Companion to Comparative Law, Mauro Bussani and Ugo Mattei (eds) 145-170 (Cambridge 
UP, 2012). 
115  Keith Rosenn, ‘Judicial Review in Brazil: Developments under the 1998 Constitution’ 
7 Southwestern Journal of Law & Trade in the Americas 291 (2000). 
116    ICN, Competition and the Judiciary, 6th ICN Annual Conference, 17 (Moscow, 2007). 
117    ICN(2007), ibid 5. 
118  OECD (2005a) (n 27); OECD (2010) (n 28) 80.   
119        Azevedo (n 4) 6. 
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advantage of court delays to challenge the fine and CADE decision.120 As Azevedo 
argues, this adverse selection of cases ‘subverts the role of the judiciary, whose 
capabilities should be employed to adjudicate legitimate disputes and not to 
postpone a predictable outcome and, hence, unintentionally mitigate the enforcement 
of competition law’.121  Postponement can also be a useful strategy for the firm 
because the responsible executive board may have been replaced by the time the 
fine is due.122   
 
9. The shift to settlements 
  
The delays and costs of court proceedings have provided a strong incentive for an 
increased number of extra-judicial settlements. Settlements or Cease and Desist 
Agreements (Termo de Compromisso de Cessação (TCC)) were introduced for 
antitrust decisions in 1994123 but they were prohibited in cartel decisions so as not to 
discourage use of leniency which was introduced in 2000 (the first application was in 
2003).124   CADE also actively promoted settlements in its negotiations with 
defendants, introducing training in negotiation for its staff and implementing a 
settlement policy, as an alternative to judicial review.125   
 
The introduction of leniency agreements for cartels and the possibility of making 
dawn raids with court authorization, equipped the competition authorities with more 
effective tools of investigation and improved techniques for the uncovering of 
evidence, such as electronic surveillance.126 While this increased the number of 																																																								
120    Azevedo points out that courts confirmed 73.9% of CADE’s decisions and that this 
has been steadily increasing to over 80% since 2008: Azevedo (n 4) 5. 
121       Azevedo ibid 6. 
122     See generally Wouter Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ 
28 World Competition 117 (2005).  Further reforms now require a mandatory deposit of the 
fine or similar bond or guarantee, pending final decision by the court, and elimination of the 
alternative of a fine to jail time: Todorov and Filho (n 10) 241. 
123  Law 8.884/1994. 
124    No. 10,1049/ 2000; Article 86 of Law No. 12,529/2011.  CADE, Guidelines - CADE’s 
Antitrust Leniency Program (2016)  
http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/publications/guidelines/guidelines-cades-antitrust-leniency-
program-final.pdf. For the relationship between leniency and settlements see discussion 
below.  
125       Azevedo (n 4) 6. 
126 Law 10,149/2000; see Leonardo Maniglia Duarte and Rodrigo Alves Dos Santos, 
‘Cartel Settlements in Brazil: Recent Developments and Upcoming Challenges’ in Cristianne 
Zarzur, Nrisztian Katona and Mariana Villela (eds), Overview of Competition Law in Brazil, ch 
XI, 285-313, 288 (IBRAC, 2015). 
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cartel prosecutions,127 it also led to a growth in court cases that contributed to 
bottlenecks in judicial review. In the absence of the possibility, as yet, of settlement 
for cartel proceedings, those unable to take advantage of leniency shifted their 
interest from challenging the substance of an infringement to questioning the 
procedural issues regarding the legality and validity of evidence.128  These court 
proceedings reallocated limited agency resources from enforcement to defending 
these legal challenges.   
 
The 1994 law was amended again in 2007 to permit CADE to include cartel decisions 
among those that could be settled.129  Various reforms to the settlement procedures 
were introduced in 2012130 and in 2016 CADE issued TCC Guidelines for cartel 
cases.131 Brazil also adopted the ICN’s ‘Anti-Cartel Enforcement Template’ to provide 
information to ICN members on its cartel enforcement strategy.132  
 
There are powerful incentives on the company to settle including the savings in 
litigation costs, and reduction in fines.133  These savings are magnified in a system 
where there are inordinate court delays. On the other hand, as we have seen, these 
court delays can be advantageous for the guilty defendant and counter the otherwise 
																																																								
127       Paulo Furquim de Azevedo and Alexandre Lauri Henriksen, ‘Cartel Deterrence and 
Settlements: the Brazilian Experience’ in Roger Zach, Andreas Heinemann and Andreas 
Kellerhals (eds), The Development of Competition Law: Global Perspectives, 211-212 
(Edward Elgar, 2010). The number of convictions obtained by CADE has been increasing. In 
2013 CADE had convictions in 22 cases which was more than the total number of convictions 
in the previous five years put together: Azevedo and Henriksen, ibid, 91. 
128    Azevedo and Henriksen, ibid 213; Duarte and Dos Santos (n 126) 289; Ragazzo and 
Thomson de Andrade (n 115) 3. 
129  Law No. 11.482, 31 May 2007. In September 2007, the CADE issued Resolution No. 
46/2007 setting out the negotiation rules.  
130  Regulation 1/2012 (CADE Bylaws).  
131  CADE, Guidelines, Cease and Desist Agreement for cartel cases (‘TCC Guidelines’) 
(2016). The guidelines are non-binding and were provided for in Article 85 of Law No. 
12,529/2011. It is not the purpose of this paper to describe in detail the procedures but to 
identify some issues arising from this strategy. For further discussion see Gabriel Nogueira 
Dias et al, ‘Unraveling the Brazilian Antitrust Settlement Practice – a First Glance’ in Barry E. 
Hawk (ed) Annual Proceedings of the Fordham Competition Law Institute: International 
Antitrust Law & Policy (Juris Pub Inc., 2014).  
132    CADE, ICN Anti-cartel Enforcement Template, Cartel Working Group (2016), 
available at http://en.cade.gov.br/topics/multilateral_cooperation_/multilateral-
cooperation/arquivos/copy2_of_ICNAnticartelEnforcementTemplate2016_CADE.pdf 
133  Daniel L. Rubinfeld, ‘Antitrust Settlements’ in Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics, ch 7, 173 (Oxford, 2014). 
cf Wils, Wouter, ‘The Use of Settlements in Public Antitrust Enforcement: Objectives and 
Principles’ in Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Mel Marquis (eds) European Competition Law 
Annual (2008): Settlements under EC Competition Law, 27-46 (Hart, 2010). 
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powerful incentive for the risk adverse defendant to settle.134 A firm can also avoid 
the publicity of a court judgment but, as Rubinfeld notes, the greater the reputational 
benefit from a trial victory ‘the less likely the case will settle’.135 Once again this 
presupposes an efficient and effective judicial system. 
 
As noted, the OECD had encouraged CADE to make more use of its settlement 
powers136 and promoted the model as an effective deterrent device for cartel 
behavior. The OECD also cautioned that effective deterrence is compromised if there 
is not a credible threat that substantial sanctions would be imposed if the case went 
to trial and suggested that ‘settlements and plea agreements should be used very 
cautiously, if at all, early in the development of a jurisdiction's anti-cartel enforcement 
efforts, before credible sanctions have been established and courts have been 
persuaded to approve or impose high fines’.137  Competition authorities are 
encouraged to resist the ‘temptation to use settlements in the first place to quickly 
clear an agency's docket and get rid of "difficult" cases, rather than to pursue the 
public interest in maximizing deterrence.’138  In the context of lengthy court delays 
Brazilian agencies may be willing to make concessions and seek those cases which 
can settle more easily or early, without a full assessment of the facts and extent of 
the cartel.139 While this may achieve certain procedural efficiencies and conserve 
valuable resources which may be utilized for other investigations, it might equally be 
counter to the broader public interest.   
 
The shift from judicial review to settlements can remove an important level of judicial 
scrutiny of regulatory processes and prevent the judiciary from having a role in the 
shaping of competition policy, particularly in tempering a more technocratic 
regulatory focus on ‘economic efficiency’ with broader ‘constitutional’ concerns and 
distributive outcomes.  The decline in judicial review may also miss opportunities to 
clarify important substantive areas of law. In addition, without a formal court decision, 
it may also mean that private damages suits are discouraged.140 Judicial review is 
																																																								
134  Azevedo (n 4) 5. 
135  Rubinfeld (n133) 173. 
136  OECD (2010) (n 28) 80; OECD (2012b) (n 30) 40. 
137  OECD (2008a) (n 99) 43. 
138  OECD (2008a) ibid. 
139  OECD (2008a) ibid. 
140  See discussion of private damages below. 
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also particularly important in circumstances where regulatory agencies may be 
subject to capture.141  
 
The increasing use of settlements and absence of judicial review ultimately pose a 
significant risk to the deterrent effect (the ‘benign big gun’) of high fines and 
criminalization.142  While the fine which is imposed as a result of settlement should 
amount to the present value of the expected sanction in a court action (so not to put 
the defendant in a more favorable position than leniency),143 the usefulness of this 
benchmark is likely to diminish as fewer court decisions are available. Predicting 
optimal punishment for deterrence is also notoriously difficult for cartels,144 and the 
level of fine and discount for cooperation varies greatly.   
 
An institutional framework which increasingly uses negotiated settlements and 
downplays the importance of judicial review is also perhaps in direct opposition to the 
French system of administrative law adopted in Brazil.  Pagotto argues that this 
system requires authorities to act in the face of infringement.  He views settlements 
as a ‘subversion of the traditional principle of inalienability of the public interest’145 
and an import from a US model based on different institutional settings ‘without 
analysis and reflection on the peculiarities related to this transplant’.146  
 
Similar to the US model and different from the EU model, leniency in Brazil is only 
permitted to the firm ‘first-in’ to the agency. The first mover is granted full immunity 
from fines in return for cooperation and disclosure.  Additional firms who seek finality 
																																																								
141  This is particularly true in jurisdictions where competition agencies find it expedient 
for the purposes of ‘competition advocacy’ and ‘sector-specific regulation’ to maintain a 
certain ‘mixture’ of functions and a more politicized role.  Neutrality and accountability may be 
compromised as these agencies combine the functions of adjudication, investigation and 
policy formulation. 
142      Leopoldo Ubiratan Carreiro Pagotto, ‘To What Extent Will the Possibility of Executing 
Agreements with Cartel Members Impact on Brazilian Antitrust Policy?’ in Eleanor M Fox and 
D Daniel Sokol (eds), Competition Law and Policy in Latin America (Hart, 2009), 127, 117-
136. 
143  The 2011 law states that the fine may not be less than the minimum fine set by law 
and takes into account the expected fine that could be imposed in case of conviction, minus a 
discount for settling. 
144          See Wouter Wils, ‘Is Criminalization of EU Competition Law the Answer?’ 28 World 
Competition 117 (2005). 
145 Cueva (n 70) 121. 
146 Ibid. 
	 30	
in outcome and reduction in fines in return for cooperation, and are unable to obtain 
leniency, must proceed through the settlement route.147   
 
The settlement process introduced certain advantages over leniency, including the 
ability to negotiate at any time regardless of the stage of investigation, the immediate 
suspension of the negotiation, the possible inclusion by CADE of a promise to refrain 
from bringing further charges against parties related to the defendant, even if they 
are not identified at the time of the agreement (a so-called ‘umbrella’ provision) and 
(initially) the absence of a requirement to plead guilty.148  The defendant only has one 
opportunity to negotiate an agreement (‘one-shot game’) but CADE has a fairly broad 
discretion as to the content of any settlement agreement. A reduction in fine can be 
obtained as a result of a negotiated decision or for information or evidence against 
other cartel participants.149  An agreement can also include the application of 
commitments such as behavioral or structural remedies (for a merger or abuse of 
dominance).150 While this discretion permits bespoke agreements, it can also create 
uncertainties and risks for the defendant.  Settlements are encouraged when there 
are transparent and predictable rules, where rewards for cooperation are clear.   
 
In 2013 CADE amended its bylaws to encourage better guidance, incentives to settle 
and procedures to ensure that the authority negotiating is best placed to extract the 
best outcome.151 These reforms were in line with ‘international best practice’, 																																																								
147           Similar to leniency, settlements therefore can uncover important evidence and to 
broaden the investigation and rate of conviction of other parties; Carvalho, The Antitrust 
Review of the Americas 2016, Global Competition Review (GCR, 2016).  
148  See discussion of guilty plea below; See generally Martinez, (n 12) 265-266; The 
International Bar Association (IBA) suggested that CADE extend the benefit of this ‘umbrella’ 
provision to those signing leniency agreements so as to remove disincentives to international 
firms: IBA, Cartels Working Group Comments on the public consultation version of the draft 
Guidelines on Leniency published by the Administrative Council for Economic Defense 
(CADE) – Brazil (2016), para 4.2, 
http://www.ibanet.org/LPD/Antitrust_Trade_Law_Section/Antitrust/WorkingGroupSubmissions
.aspx 
149  The 2013 amendments included the requirement to provide ‘meaningful cooperation’: 
CADE (TCC Guidelines) (n131). 
150  In Brazil the first applicant will receive a 30-50% discount from the estimated fine, the 
second applicant, 25-40%, the third and other applicants up to 25%. If the approach is made 
after the files are sent to the Tribunal, the possible reduction is a maximum of 15%: Article 
187, CADE Regulation 1/2012.  
151  Duarte and Dos Santos note that the fact-finding authority at the time, the Secretariat 
of the Economic Defense of the Ministry of Justice (SDE/MJ) did not participate in the 
negotiations, ‘which limited the possibilities of extracting more effective cooperation from the 
defendants settling’: (n 126) 290. Reforms permitted negotiations to occur with the 
Superintendency as well as the Tribunal: ibid, 292. 
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particularly the EU’s fining and leniency guidelines. Larger discounts in fines were 
given to encourage parties to come forward and cooperate with additional information 
at the earliest stage of investigation. The previous practice of little or no co-operation 
by the defendant was replaced by the requirement of ‘meaningful cooperation’.152 
 
Leniency programs are important tools for the detection and investigation of cartels 
and CADE needs to ensure that clear and separate processes are in place for 
settlements and commitments so as not to undermine leniency and raise any 
concerns regarding uncertain or discretionary interventions.  The OECD has 
cautioned that settlements could undermine leniency if they do not maintain a clear 
difference between the reward for the first to report a cartel (for outright immunity) 
and those who report later for a settlement. Firms will be encouraged to wait for 
settlements ‘if they lead to unreasonably generous combined discounts for 
cooperation and settlement’. 153   
 
The EU maintains this distinction by clearly differentiating the procedures for 
commitments, leniency and settlements.  Settlements are only available when the 
investigation is concluded and the reduction in fine is limited to 10%.154  The 
reduction in fine is related to procedural efficiencies only, rather than the collection of 
evidence, so that no possible disincentive or uncertainty arises for the application of 
leniency or immunity agreements.  Commitments are also not intended for hardcore 
cartels.155  
 
The model of ‘negotiated settlements’ that has emerged in Brazil differs from this EU 
approach. It is very much based on the US common law system that does not 
necessarily distinguish between the rewards for cooperation and disclosure of 
evidence under leniency and a plea bargain.  This may not be appropriate in a civil 																																																								
152 Bruno De Luca Drago and Fabianna Vieira Barbosa Morselli, Brazil Cartels, 2015 
Antitrust Review of the Americas, Global Antitrust Review, 91-94 (2015). 
153  OECD (2009) Experience with Direct Settlements in Cartel Cases, 
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and Article 23 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 in cartel cases (2008). 
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law jurisdiction where the negotiating parties may not be in a position to deal with all 
aspects of liability, including criminal liability.156 In the US the negotiated plea bargain 
is also strongly linked to the requirement for judicial approval. Consultation and the 
creation of a public ‘Competitive Impact Statement’ is mandatory for a consent 
degree in the US, which must then be approved by the courts.  As Rubinfeld notes 
‘when resolved through a formal consent decree, settlements can have significant 
precedential value’.157  Confidentiality of information obtained in leniency and 
settlement agreements also raises obstacles for the effectiveness of private 
enforcement.158 The appropriateness of allowing the defendant in Brazil to waive a 
constitutional right to judicial review for ‘any injury or threat to a right’,159 thereby 
excluding the courts entirely in the context of a settlement negotiation,160 is also 
problematic from the perspective of the institutional  dynamics of an emerging 
Brazilian competition law regime.  In addition there are also few ‘public interest’ 
groups in Brazil ready and able to litigate as a counterpoint in the event of regulatory 
capture and corruption.161   
 
Concerns have also been raised by the manner in which the reforms to the 
settlement process were proposed and implemented in Brazil.  Amendments to the 
1994 law in 2007 delegated to CADE powers to establish rules for settlement 
agreements through bylaws and regulations.162 The bylaws themselves and their 
future amendment have therefore been subject to little Congressional scrutiny.  In 
this context CADE has looked more often to adopt ‘international best practice’ during 
the reform process. For example, a working group to train negotiators is encouraged 
‘to study more effective negotiating techniques based on the best international 
practices’ including training abroad and exchanging experiences with antitrust 
authorities from other jurisdictions.163  While the adoption of these international 																																																								
156  See discussion below. 
157  Rubinfeld (n 133), 183. The OECD also cautions that too much interference by courts 
can undermine the effectiveness of a plea agreement by introducing uncertainty into the 
negotiations: OECD (2008a) (n 99) 43. 
158  See discussion below. 
159  Constituição da República Federativa Do Brazil de 1988, Article 5. 
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161         Pagotto (n 142) 133- 134. 
162  CADE adopted Regulation 1/2012 (CADE Bylaws). 
163 Duarte and Dos Santos (n 126) 291; CADE Regulation No 51/2009. Similar calls to 
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practices can be beneficial, they may also signal missed opportunities to develop a 
bespoke scheme that could be better adapted to the Brazilian institutional constraints 
we have identified.  	
10. The requirement to accept a guilty plea 
 
While the OECD recommended that settlements should always record a plea of 
guilty, there was initially no requirement for such a plea in the Brazilian cartel 
settlement scheme except in circumstances where a leniency agreement was also 
executed.164  There were concerns that the extraction of a guilty plea could lead to 
sub-optimal penalties and thereby potentially undermine deterrence.165  The absence 
of a guilty plea however undermined the incentive to seek leniency over a settlement 
agreement.166  A guilty plea could also expose the defendant to possible criminal 
liability in contrast to a leniency agreement which protected the ‘first in’ defendant 
from both civil and criminal prosecution.167   
 
In the first year of its operation only four settlement agreements were concluded 
(from 16 applications) and three did not involve a guilty plea because they were not 
concluded in conjunction with a leniency agreement.168  SDE issued opinions in 2007 
and 2008 critical of CADE’s decision to settle cartel cases without the extraction of 
guilty plea citing the negative effect on deterrence in light of the direct evidence 
available of hardcore cartel activity.169 In response to these concerns CADE in 2013 
introduced the requirement that a cartel settlement include the defendant’s 
‘acknowledgement of participation in the investigated conduct’.170 But as Martinez 
points out  ‘the provision does not refer to a “confession” and the requirement “to 
acknowledge participation” may allow for some flexibility with respect to its terms, 
																																																								
whereby leniency applicants are encouraged to confess involvement in additional and 
separate cartel activities during investigation process: Duarte and Dos Santos (n 126) 305. 
164  OECD (2009) (n 153) 8; CADE Resolution No 46/2007.   
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170  Article 185, RICADE (CADE’s Internal Regulations), CADE Regulation 1/2012; CADE 
states that this requirement has been approved by the Brazilian courts: CADE (TCC 
Guidelines) (n 131) 37. 
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compared with a strict “confession” requirement.’171 Some ambiguity still remains 
therefore regarding how this acknowledgment will impact on criminal proceedings.   
 
Other institutional factors in Brazil also increase this uncertainty.  Unlike the US 
where the settlement forms part of a plea bargain with a single judicial body which 
can grant civil as well as criminal immunity, more than one institution deals with these 
issues in Brazil. The absence of a single authority imposes a risk to parties who seek 
settlement and increases the uncertainty about criminal liability being decided 
elsewhere.172  In an attempt to deal with this issue in 2016 CADE signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the Federal Prosecution Service of São Paulo 
with the intent of increasing transparency and improving coordination of both the civil 
and criminal aspects of a TCC.173 The TCC Guidelines also state that CADE may 
assist any party who wishes to obtain a plea bargain in its communication with the 
Public Prosecutor.174  Uncertainties still remain however.  The TCC Guidelines are 
not binding and no absolute guarantees of immunity are raised by these negotiations.  
CADE’s role in the protection from criminal liability (in both leniency and settlements) 
will also continue to pose questions of legitimacy, given the nature of administrative 
of its authority.175   
 
Effectiveness of enforcement as a deterrent mechanism is also largely dependent on 
the perception of punishment, both by participants in the cartel and consumers at 
large. In Brazil there is a general cultural perception that participation in cartels may 
not be punishable conduct176 and this can reduce the incentives for a guilty plea. 
Fewer guilty pleas, together with a reduced number of convictions by courts, can 
exacerbate and re-enforce this public perception.  Similarly the use of a ‘leniency 
regime’ may also not sit well in Brazil, where ‘accusations against peers are not part 
of the culture (and are actually seen by some as unethical)’.177  Competition policy, 
particularly the criminalization of cartels, is often in direct opposition to a culture and 
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industrial policy which favors more cooperation. Historically, the Brazilian government 
itself expected industries to coordinate, including price collusion, for the purposes of 
industrialization.178  Brazil, like many emerging economies, has an ambivalent 
political and cultural attitude towards competition as a value, either due to the strong 
presence of the state or the view that excessive competition is detrimental to infant 
industries, wasteful of limited resources and imposes negative externalities on 
sustainability and the environment.179  
 
As Maurice Stucke also points out, drawing on the insights of behavioral economics 
to examine the relationship between competition law and intent, increased penalties 
and criminalization are seldom fully applied by agencies and courts.180  
Criminalization and punitive fines are often perceived as unfair for cartel cases 
because the underlying offence can lack specificity.181   In highly concentrated 
markets, for example, economists cannot easily distinguish collusion from pro-
competitive (and therefore desirable) market behavior. The alleged perpetrator’s 
involvement may also be unclear or he or she may not have directly benefited from 
the cartel profits.  The economic harm to markets caused by price fixing/ cartels does 
not easily translate to clear legal rules and probative evidence to determine moral 
blame.   
With leniency and settlement, cooperation and detection is valued over punishment.  
For the European Commission, the ‘interests of consumers and citizens in ensuring 
that secret cartels are detected and punished outweigh the interest in fining those 
undertakings that enable the Commission to detect and prohibit such practices.’182 As 
more cartel participants obtain leniency (and settlements), the perceived pernicious 
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nature of these cartel offences and the appropriateness of increased penalties and 
criminalization is further undermined.183  
The perception of punishment is further complicated when CADE may take into 
account the existence of a ‘Compliance Program’184 in a settlement agreement as a 
mitigating circumstance for the reduction of a fine, as evidence of the good faith of 
the offender. The program must be related to the subject matter of the TCC (e.g. by 
uncovering the infringement) and ‘relate directly to the decision to propose a TCC 
and/or resulting from cooperation presented within the scope of the TCC’.185  This 
approach is problematic for both immunity schemes and fine reduction because the 
‘higher the fine reduction, the more compliance programmes thus become a cheap 
insurance policy against full antitrust liability.’186  
 
11. Liability for private damages 
 
A guilty plea may also expose a defendant to private damages suits. In Brazil (as in 
many other jurisdictions) members of cartel, even if signatories to a leniency or 
settlement agreement, are jointly and severable liable for damages caused by 
anticompetitive action.  Private enforcement, through actions for damages, can be an 
important supplement to public action and an effective tool to achieve the goals of 
competition law: deterrence and compensation.187  Effectiveness depends however 																																																								
183  The desire not to threaten domestic leniency applications was also at the basis of 
amicus briefs by the EU and other foreign agencies to the Supreme Court in F. Hoffmann-La 
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ch 8 (Edward Elgar, 2011).  An examination of the level of local compliance with competition 
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Perspective’ 64 (4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 935-963 (2015). 
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on access to courts and a civil procedure conducive to private plaintiffs. The level of 
private enforcement of competition law in most jurisdictions, other than the US, is still 
struggling to have any real impact.  As we have seen, institutional constraints also 
impact on the likelihood of private damages in Brazil, as costly and difficult access to 
the civil justice system and a formal and rigid system of civil procedure result in the 
filing of fewer suits.188  The relative certainty and predictability of a private damages 
suit based on a ‘follow-on action’, where the plaintiff can rely on a settled and final 
ruling by the competition agency, is also problematic in a civil system where all the 
evidence of the administrative investigation may be re-examined by the courts.189 
 
Applicants are also keen to maintain confidentiality of information disclosed as part of 
a leniency or settlement agreement in order to minimize the risk of further civil 
liability.  In Brazil information made available through the course of settlement 
negotiations is therefore treated as confidential and access is restricted to the 
immediate parties to the proceedings and only disclosed when it is submitted to the 
CADE administrative court.  A generic document containing a less detailed summary 
of what is available to CADE is made available to the public and is disclosed to other 
defendants only for purposes of exercising their right of defense.190 Documents are 
also returned or destroyed if an agreement is not reached.191 The extent of this 
protection in actual cases is subject to a fairly broad discretion in the Brazilian 
system. Efforts to maintain confidentially may also be futile if information is made 
available through parallel actions, such as the evidence required for judicial 
authorisation for a dawn raid or a separate criminal investigation.192  This lack of 
clarity can undermine certainty and risk exposure to further proceedings.   
 
While the promise of confidentiality can strengthen the bargaining position of the 
government negotiator, the impact on private damages suits should also be 
considered.  As Rubinfeld points out ‘secret settlements are troubling; they keep 
valuable information from the public-information that could inform the decisions of 																																																								
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future litigants’.193  The authorities’ priorities in saving public resources and 
deterrence may place less importance on fostering private enforcement.194 
 
The European Commission has also set out rules to prevent the disclosure of 
documents obtained through leniency to claimants in private action suits,195 but the 
European Courts have sought to apply different rules. In a number of decisions, the 
courts have stated that the public interest in the encouragement of leniency must be 
balanced against the well-established right of individuals to bring a claim for 
damages and that it is up to national courts to balance these interests on a case by 
case basis.196  The balancing of public and private interests by European Courts 
imposes an important layer of constitutional scrutiny on the European Commission’s 
decision to withhold documents.  Once again, the absence of an effective system of 
judicial review in Brazil means these principles may not always be considered by the 
Brazilian competition authorities. 
 
12.  Applications by International firms 
 
As noted the settlement regime was slow at the beginning and in the first year of its 
operation only four were concluded (from 16 applications).197  Following the 2007 
amendments to the 1994 law and bylaws, there was a marked increase in the 
number of settlement agreements in cartel cases and 21 were executed between 
2007 and 2010.198 Further reforms to the settlement programs in 2011 and 2013 saw 
a further increase in the number concluded from six in 2013 to 38 in 2014 (22 of 
these were cartel cases).199  Overall CADE has signed 54 leniency agreements since 
the beginning of the program and entered into 100 TCCs related to cartels.200 
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The majority of leniency and settlement agreements in Brazil, particularly in the early 
years of their operation, have been disproportionately 
executed by multinational firms.201 As Azevedo and Henriksen point out:  
Pleading guilty or committing to collateral obligations in one jurisdiction may 
have adverse spillovers on the prosecution of a cartel in other jurisdictions, 
particularly in the case of international cartels. That is probably why part of 
the demand for settlements in Brazil, similar to the experience with leniency 
agreements, is from multinational companies that are settling simultaneously 
in several countries.202  
 
As we have seen, harmonized procedures can be beneficial for global corporations 
who may face civil and criminal liability for conduct in multiple jurisdictions.  
Unharmonized regimes with divergent procedures can pose huge risks and 
uncertainties to these firms.  As the OECD points out: 
 
Incentives to cooperate and to seek settlements might be undermined if there 
is no uniform approach to settlements and if a settlement in one jurisdiction is 
perceived to increase exposure to sanctions in continuing investigations 
elsewhere and/or in private follow-on actions.203 
 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the procedures for the use of leniency and 
settlement regimes in Brazil have been subjected to keen scrutiny by the 																																																								
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international organisations that have a particular interest in increasing harmonization 
and reducing exposure for international firms. In commenting on CADE’s Draft 
Brazilian Leniency Guidelines the International Bar Association (IBA) was critical of 
requirement to provide a written (rather than oral) admission of the participation of 
the company or individual in the conspiracy.204 This requirement, the IBA argued, 
created a disincentive to international firms:  
The potential risk that leniency applicants would face in numerous key 
jurisdictions could exceed the benefits that could be expected from receiving 
leniency in a single country. This could create major disincentives for potential 
applicants to seek leniency in Brazil, thereby posing a risk of marginalizing 
Brazil's significance in international cartel enforcement and diminishing 
Brazil's ability to cooperate with counterparts in other developed antitrust 
jurisdictions. Even more far reaching in consequence, in global cartel 
situations, the absence of an effective oral leniency regime in one significant 
jurisdiction (such as Brazil) could prevent a potential leniency applicant from 
applying for leniency at all.205  
In support of their argument the IBA cites ‘international practice’ and notes that ‘US, 
Canada and European Union, have adopted policies that provide for paperless 
leniency application’.206 Once again the recommendations are drawn from developed 
jurisdictions and driven by the risk to international firms. They caution that Brazil’s 
‘significance in international cartel enforcement’ will be marginalized, rather than a 
concern for the negative impact confidentiality may have on a fledging system of 
private damages and a weaker system of judicial enforcement in Brazil.  They also 
ignore, as noted above, the judicial safeguards the EU courts have in place in this 
area. 
 
Many of the international settlements entered into by Brazil are also not the outcome 
of independent investigation by Brazilian authorities. They often rely ‘on U.S. court 
convictions to open an investigation in order to assess the effects of conduct on the 
Brazilian market. Evidence gathered by EU and U.S. agencies has been used as a 
source and probable alternative to the insufficient number of technicians needed to 
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cover all the necessary investigations abroad’.207  Resource constraints and 
information asymmetries may mean that Brazilian authorities will ‘not have much 
opportunity to handle competition law violations occurring outside Brazilian territory, 
nor do they process the structure and know-how to do so’.208 International parties 
may also prefer settlement over a trial because of the absence, as compared to the 
US, of procedural instruments in civil litigation, discovery, cross-examination in 
Brazil.209  
 
13. Conclusion 
 
Many of the recent reforms to the legal and regulatory institutions of competition law 
in Brazil have followed closely the recommendations of global experts and 
international agencies such as the ICN and OECD in ‘peer reviews’ and guidelines 
regarding ‘international best practice’.  These recommendations have proved a useful 
and powerful means to effect domestic legislative and regulatory reform.  To the 
extent that some of these reforms may bypass other forms of governmental scrutiny 
they have posed questions regarding their democratic legitimacy. It is also true that 
many of these ‘international best practices’, especially reforms which aim to 
streamline procedures for international mergers and maintain confidentiality for 
information submitted through leniency and settlements, coincide more with the 
interests of multinational companies and the flow of international commerce than the 
divergent needs of emerging economies, potentially side-stepping more immediate 
political concerns and industrial policy which may require bespoke and national 
solutions.  The move to establish autonomous, apolitical and single-function 
competition institutions, in line with views of the ‘regulatory state’, may similarly mean 
that goals such as competition advocacy and sector-specific regulation in an 
emerging economy, which may benefit from more political intrusion and information, 
can also be compromised.  
 
The second part of this paper examined this reform process in a particular policy 
area in Brazilian competition law: the sharp decline in level of judicial review and an 
increasing resort to extra-judicial means of settling disputes through ‘settlement 
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agreements’, especially for public enforcement against cartels.  The shift from judicial 
review to settlements can remove an important level of scrutiny of regulatory 
processes and prevent the judiciary from having a role in shaping competition policy 
in Brazil, potentially compromising certainty, transparency, accountability and 
deterrence.  The increasing resort to settlements in a context of weak judicial 
enforcement, poor access to private damages suits (which is exacerbated by 
nondisclosure of evidence) and low risk of exposure to criminalization weakens the 
overall deterrent effect of these agreements. The largely discretionary nature of 
negotiated penalties (which are not subject to judicial consent), including the taking 
account of mitigating factors such as compliance programs, also works against other 
reform processes which value transparent, autonomous and accountable regulatory 
institutions and the application of specific technocratic rules.  It is also true that many 
of these settlement (and leniency) agreements have been taken advantage of by 
international firms who desire to minimize their exposure to public and private 
enforcement in multiple jurisdictions. 
 
While international agencies have encouraged the use of settlement programmes as 
a means to increase deterrence, their effectiveness as a deterrent device is very 
much dependent on the institutional framework for enforcement. It requires the 
intersection of a number of finely balanced factors which reduce uncertainty and risk 
for the applicant by minimizing exposure to criminalization and/or private damages.  
The operation of the Brazilian cartel settlement program provides a good example of 
how institutional, particularly the civil law context, and cultural factors can demand 
modification, adaptation and even resistance to the mere transfer of an international 
harmonized model and thereby disrupt its potential benefits and outcomes.   
 
Brazil is a BRICS economy with a long and effective history of competition law 
enforcement.  It is important that it continues to strengthen and improve the 
transparency and accountability of its settlement procedures, so that they are not just 
a mechanism ‘to quickly clear an agency's docket and get rid of "difficult" cases’.  
Settlements must therefore operate alongside efforts to promote and sustain strong 
judicial review (including judicial consent of settlements). In doing so, deterrence will 
be maintained and efforts towards public advocacy of competition rules are not 
undermined.  These are challenging and difficult objectives, but it is important that 
the agenda for competition reform be fully informed by national (alongside regional 
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and global) concerns in order to avoid, in the absence of effective judicial review, a 
new form of undemocratic governance by international agencies.   
